In the Report by V4 Panel of Eminent Personalities, the following was indicated: the aspiration of Visegrad transcends that of a mere regional integration grouping. It is also an international actor in its own right, with a set of external relations, a common defence structure in the shape of the Visegrad EU Battle-group, and an ambitious geopolitical vision: contributing to a united and peaceful Europe. Given the vexing state of contemporary European security, Visegrad cannot afford to forgo its original aspiration; instead, we should pursue it with renewed vigour and strategic foresight.
In the foreseeable future, the Visegrad Group will not – and should not – expand. While its membership falls short of covering Central Europe as a whole, it is nonetheless too established and historically-rooted a brand for enlargement to be a viable option. Instead, Visegrad should refine and diversify its engagement with regional partners and third countries in the V4Plus framework.
At the moment, Visegrad has more than twenty external partners, ranging from the EU Member States through Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries to Japan. While testifying to the maturity, flexibility and comprehensiveness of the V4 outreach, such a wide scope of partnerships, if developed under a single institutional umbrella, carries the risk of diluting political focus. Differentiation seems a reasonable way forward. We should identify a distinctive group of key partners – notably Germany, Austria and other EU members, as well as countries of the Western Balkan and Eastern neighbourhood regions who express ambition for more intensive cooperation – and establish special relationships that lift them out of the overarching V4+ concept.
When leveraging its external partnerships - and the various instruments of bilateral and multilateral dialogue, technical assistance or IVF-funded education and cultural programs – Visegrad should position itself as a regional hub: a conduit for harnessing the power of cross-national networks; a platform for connecting state, corporate and civil society actors from the EU Member States, candidate countries and Eastern neighbours. In the same spirit, and drawing on its own template, Visegrad should engage with and promote regional integration initiatives, especially in the Western Balkans.
Beyond our immediate vicinity, Visegrad should carry on cooperating with current or new partners in the existing V4Plus framework, focusing also - though not exclusively – on coordinated economic diplomacy and joint promotion of V4 exporters.
While V4 partnerships are useful in promoting stability, democracy and good governance in the region, it is through common EU external policies that our countries wield the greatest power to shape outcomes. Two dossiers should feature atop our agenda: Western Balkan enlargement and the Eastern Partnership. Both projects are in a state of flux, their constitutive ideas contested, and their direction uncertain; which is why, in the years ahead, Visegrad should mobilize its regional expertise and exercise strategic leadership in driving the two EU policies forward.
Having benefited from the transformative power of EU enlargement, Visegrad countries have a moral duty – as well as a strategic imperative - to push for the completion of the Western Balkan enlargement and realize the promise of Thessaloniki. The persistence of EU’s enlargement fatigue, in conjunction with effects of the refugee crisis and accumulated problems in the rule of law and institution-building, puts the region at risks of renewed instability. Visegrad countries must cohere around a viable plan of action to inject new momentum into the process.
The Eastern Partnership, which Visegrad countries helped instigate in 2009, fell victim to a similar spiral of frustrated hopes and political disinterest. The review of EU’s neighbourhood policy, completed in 2015, portends a turn toward a more interest-based and security-focused approach, partly in response to the Ukraine conflict. In this changing landscape, Visegrad countries should cohere around a shared hierarchy of priorities when it comes to security, democratisation, energy, or mobility. Visegrad countries should lead a coalition of like-minded EU members in framing a positive vision of deeper engagement with Eastern neighbours, especially with partners who have demonstrated the commitment to European values and embarked on costly reforms in the framework of the Association and DCFTA Agreements.
While fully anchored in the EU and NATO, Central Europe remains a region squeezed between Western and Eastern Europe, which means it must be actively engaged in strategic debates on the future of European security architecture. Visegrad countries have a solid track-record in defence and security cooperation, culminating in the EU Battle-Group Project, which is currently (2016) on standby. They have acted responsibly and constructively in supporting NATO’s efforts to bolster the Eastern flank of the Alliance in the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Likewise, they have aligned themselves with common EU positions in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and, despite some early hesitations, endorsed EU’s sanctions package against Russia, conditional upon full implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Moreover, V4 countries have a strong interest in strengthening the cooperation between the EU and the NATO.
As too many of Europe’s political and institutional structures, Visegrad was designed and thrived in times of good weather. It cemented political trust and facilitated our Euro-Atlantic integration under an exceptionally benign set of regional and geopolitical circumstances. That era is over. In the next 25 years, Visegrad must adapt to a more convoluted reality.
The ongoing migration crisis is but one manifestation of the challenges ahead of us. Irregular migration flows are symptomatic of the growing tension between the forces of globalization and interdependence, on the one hand, and political and security fragmentation, on the other. The crisis also reminds us that complex phenomena such as immigration cannot be addressed through national measures alone. Rather, they necessitate collective action, political solidarity, and holistic solutions, encompassing tools of security, international law, diplomacy, economics, and social or cultural integration policy.
As the Visegrad Group, our shared priority must be to protect the freedom of movement guaranteed by Schengen, one of the greatest achievements of European integration. The Visegrad countries, three of which act as guardians of Schengen’s border, must partake in forging a common European approach.
As it confronts future challenges, Visegrad cooperation can build on 25 years of steady progress and accrued political trust. It must stay true to the values, structures and practices that served it well while reinforcing and reinvent them to stay fit for purpose. That inter alia includes more effective institutional framework for implementation of regional projects; closer coordination of positions and stepped-up role in EU and NATO decision-making; bringing down barriers to trade, investment and capital flows; streamlining of financing mechanisms, including a new Development Fund; enhanced planning and analytical capabilities by the strengthening of the cooperation among the V4 think tanks; and a concerted effort to boost the Visegrad brand in the region and across Europe.
It is often asserted that having fulfilled the objectives of accession to the EU and NATO, Visegrad is an organization without a purpose. We disagree. To the extent that Visegrad needs to frame a new meta-narrative a forward-looking vision to organize its activities – it need not alter its founding ideals, which tied our region’s future to that of a united and peaceful Europe: to navigate the uncertainty and challenges of the next 25 years, Europe will need a strong, cohesive and engaged Visegrad as Visegrad will need a strong, cohesive and engaged EU (Visegrad, 2016).
